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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence. The state
challenges the district court’s determination that ascertaining probation status is not a valid
component of a traffic stop.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Cora Lee Burgess with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.
60-61.) She filed a motion to suppress, asserting that “the warrantless extension of the stop
by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification.” (R., pp. 62-63.) After a
hearing (R., p. 94), the district court found the following facts:
Officers stopped Burgess for a traffic infraction. (R., pp. 94-95.) Joshua Craig was
the passenger in the pickup. (R., p. 95.) Officers gathered the relevant information from
Burgess and Craig. (R., p. 95.) Both were nervous, and “Craig appeared as if he was under
the influence of something.” (R., p. 95.) During the next seven and one-half minutes
officers checked Burgess’s and Craig’s information using the computer in the police car.
(R., p. 95.) About five and one-half minutes into that process Burgess’s check was
completed and Craig’s check was completed except for determining his probation status.
(R., pp. 95-96.) Thus, the final two minutes of checking the vehicle occupants’ information
were dedicated to an inquiry into Craig’s probation status. (R., pp. 96, 100.1)
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The district court found that Craig was not on probation (R., pp. 95-96), but that finding
is clearly erroneous. The testimony was that Craig was on unsupervised probation (Tr., p.
21, L. 22 – p. 22, L. 1) and the exhibit corroborates that testimony when dispatch informs
the officers that Craig was a drug court participant (State’s Exhibit 1, at 11:25-11:29). If
this fact becomes significant for the analysis, the state requests this Court to apply the clear
error standard and reverse the district court’s factual finding.
1

After completing the check of the occupants’ information, including the inquiry
into Craig’s probation status, one officer issued Burgess a citation while another officer
interacted with Craig. (R., pp. 96-97.) When Craig admitted having syringes, officers
detained both Burgess and Craig. (R., pp. 96-97; ----see also Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-9; p. 30, Ls. 16.) Burgess later gave consent to search. (R., p. 97.)
The district court characterized the issue presented as “whether delaying moving
forward with a traffic stop is lawful in order to verify a passenger’s probation status.” (R.,
p. 101.) The district court declared that the “dispositive fact” was that “there was some
time (‘a minute or two’) between the time [the officer] finished checking Burgess’s
information and the commencement of issuing her a citation.” (R., p. 100.) The district
court concluded that the officers’ action of confirming Craig’s probation status was not “a
permissible task tied to the traffic infraction.” (R., p. 101 (internal quotation omitted).)
Thus, the act of “waiting a minute or two for dispatch to verify a passenger’s probation
status before proceeding with issuing the driver a traffic citation” unlawfully prolonged the
stop. (R., pp. 94, 98-102.) The district court therefore granted the motion to suppress. (R.,
p. 102.)
The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order. (R., pp.
107-10.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded that inquiries into probation status are
beyond the scope of a routine records check allowed during a traffic stop?
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ARGUMENT
Inquiries Into Probation Status Are Not Beyond The Scope Of A Routine Records Check
Conducted Pursuant To A Traffic Stop
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that a check of Craig’s probation status through a

records check by dispatch was a separate investigation beyond the scope of a traffic stop.
Review of the applicable law shows that although inquiries into potential unrelated
criminal activities are beyond the scope of a traffic stop, inquiries into non-criminal matters
such as outstanding warrants and probation and parole status are within the scope of a
routine records check conducted pursuant to a traffic stop. The district court erred by
holding otherwise.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on

a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the trial court’s findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the court] freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho
728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That An Inquiry Into Craig’s
Probation Status Was Beyond The Scope Of A Routine Records Check
“Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop

context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (internal citations omitted). In the course of
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investigating the traffic violation and attending to related safety concerns an officer
conducting a traffic stop may make “ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop.” Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the
driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at
___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615; see
also --------State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 367 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Ct.
- --App. 2016) (“Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not
necessarily violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”). In addition, “inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not
convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333
(2009). Application of these legal standards shows that the district court erred when it
concluded that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officers’ inquiry into Craig’s
probation status.
Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho appellate courts have
weighed in on the permissible scope of the “ordinary inquiries incident to [a traffic] stop,”
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, other than that they “typically” include the existence and validity
of the driver’s license, registration, and insurance, and also include whether there are
outstanding warrants, Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Courts that have
specifically considered whether probation status is within the scope of permissible inquiries
incident to a traffic stop have held that it is. United States v. Hendrix, 143 F.Supp.3d 724
(M.D. Tenn. 2015); United States v. Rodriguez, 100 F.Supp.3d 905, 924 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(“that such questioning [regarding probation or parole status] related to officer safety and
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sought information that would be revealed by a routine records check militate against a
finding of unreasonableness”); United States v. Singleton, 608 F.Supp.2d 397, 404
(W.D.N.Y. 2009) (officer justified in asking stopped defendant “whether he was then on
probation or parole”); Miller v. State, 922 A.2d 1158, 1163 (Del. 2007) (“it was permissible
for Officer Kelly to ask Miller if he was on probation, while Miller was lawfully detained
initially to enforce the loitering statute”). Because, like the inquiry into the existence of
outstanding warrants, inquiry into the probation or parole status of a stopped person is part
of the ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop, the district court erred.
In making its ruling, the district court relied on two cases out of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. (R., p. 101.) Neither of these cases support the district court’s holding.
In United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2015), a Nevada officer
conducting a traffic stop, after running routine checks which returned negative, “requested
an ex-felon registration check.” Id. at 782-83. Under Nevada law a person convicted of
certain felonies has to register with the county sheriff, and failure to do so is a
misdemeanor. Id. at 783 n.5. The court held that the “additional” check on whether Evans
was an unregistered felon, conducted after completion of the ordinary inquiries attendant
to a traffic stop, was “wholly unrelated” to the purposes of the stop and was instead “aimed
at detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id. at 786 (internal brackets and
quotes omitted).
In United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2017), Gorman contested the
forfeiture of alleged drug proceeds. The facts included that he was stopped for a traffic
violation by a police officer in Nevada who, suspecting Gorman was transporting drug
money, “unsuccessfully attempted to summon a drug-sniffing dog and then prolonged
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Gorman’s roadside detention, which lasted nearly half an hour, as he conducted a nonroutine records check.” Id. at 709. The “non-routine records check” used to extend the
encounter was a contact with the “El Paso Intelligence Center” (EPIC) to
compare Gorman’s home address with its database of information related
to drug and weapons smuggling, money laundering, and human trafficking.
EPIC returned a notification that there was a Drug Enforcement Agency
“hit” on Gorman involving the transfer of $11,000 in 2006. EPIC also
indicated that Gorman had entered or exited the United States four times,
on one occasion flying from Madrid, Spain to John F. Kennedy Airport in
New York. [The officer] told the EPIC operator that he did not “have a dog
on [him]” and that he was “going to try to gain consent” and would “call
and let [EPIC] know” whether he succeeded in gaining Gorman’s consent
to search the vehicle. [The officer] also asked EPIC to run a search on a
different address associated with Gorman, which returned the same results.
Id. at 711 (text “[The officer]” added, other bracketed text original). The Ninth Circuit
panel, citing Evans, 786 F.3d at 788, concluded the EPIC inquiry was also “aimed at
detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” and was therefore not an inquiry
incident to the traffic stop. Gorman, 859 F.3d at 715.
Neither the holdings nor the analyses in Evans and Gorman support the district
court’s reasoning in this case. In Evans the inquiry was into whether Evans committed the
unrelated misdemeanor of failing to register as a felon and in Gorman the inquiry was into
whether Gorman was transporting drug proceeds. Inquiry into Craig’s probation status,
like inquiry into whether there were any outstanding arrest warrants, was not an
investigation of some separate crime. Just like having an outstanding arrest warrant is not
a crime, being on probation is not a crime. Rather, the inquiry into probation or parole
status, like the inquiry into outstanding warrants, is related to the mission of traffic law
enforcement and officer safety and is not “a measure aimed at detecting evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Rodriguez, ___ U.S. at ___ 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (internal
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quote and brackets omitted). Unlike stopping the traffic inquiries to use a drug dog to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, which “abandon[ed] the purpose of the
stop,” the probation inquiry in this case did not “deviate from the original purpose of the
stop.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
The officers in this case did not deviate from the purposes of the stop when they
made the inquiry about Craig’s probation status. Unlike the cases relied on by the district
court, an inquiry into a driver’s or passenger’s probation status does not initiate a criminal
investigation unrelated to the purpose of the stop. Rather, like the warrant check, it
addresses the traffic violation that warranted the stop and the related safety concerns. The
district court therefore erred in concluding that the probation inquiry violated Burgess’s
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
suppressing evidence obtained during the traffic stop.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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